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# MONTHLY REVIEW

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VOL. 13

## THE RESUMPTION OF TESTING

6

LEO HUBERMAN  
PAUL M. SWEZY  
J. P. MORRAY

## HAS CAPITALISM CHANGED?

JOAN ROBINSON

*Where I Stand*

CHEDDI JAGAN

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## NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

We have a couple of items of good news for book lovers who can't afford current high prices of books.

(1) *The Alienation of Modern Man* by Fritz Pappenheim, originally published by MR Press at \$4 in a cloth binding, is now available in a handsome paperback edition for \$1.25. (This book, by the way, is the subject of not one but two reviews in the current (Autumn) issue of *Science & Society*, one very favorable and one highly critical. Read the reviews and we think you will want to read the book and make up your own mind which is right.) Since the paperback edition has been made up from a batch of left-over sheets, we have only a limited number available. So send in your order right away.

(2) Because of the high initial cost, we can never bring out J. P. Murray's *From Yalta to Disarmament: Cold War Debate* in a paperback edition. But since we are anxious to have this very important work read as widely as possible, we are offering it as a Christmas special at a price of \$5 compared to the regular price of \$8.50. As books go these days, we

(continued on inside back cover)

## THE RESUMPTION OF TESTING

The editors of Monthly Review are usually in close agreement on major economic and political issues. But not always. Over the years since the magazine was founded, there have been a number of occasions on which we have been unable to resolve our disagreements. Normally, in such cases, we have simply refrained from editorial comment, concentrating instead on one or more of the vastly larger number of issues where no disagreement exists. On one occasion, however, the presidential election of 1952, we felt that comment was called for despite disagreement, and each of us expressed his view under his own name. A similar situation has now arisen in connection with the resumption of nuclear testing, and we are dealing with it in the same way. The order of the two statements which follow is purely alphabetical.

In addition to these editorial comments on nuclear testing, we are publishing an article on the subject by J. P. Morray whose book *From Yalta to Disarmament: Cold War Debate* has just been published by Monthly Review Press. Professor Morray is a leading student of the subject of disarmament, and his analysis, summarizing material which is presented in great detail in the book, helps to put the Soviet decision to renew testing in what both editors agree is its proper context.

## (I) By Leo Huberman

*The first government to resume tests should be denounced as the enemy of peace and of mankind.*

That's what the Tokyo Peace Conference said in its final resolution in August 1961. The resolution was passed unanimously.

The delegates who voted for it—including those from the Soviet Union—were right when they passed that resolution. And they were still right a few weeks later when, to the consternation of all those struggling for peace, it was the Soviet Union which became the first government to resume tests.

Soviet fallout is not less dangerous than was American fallout. We were all very much concerned when Linus Pauling spoke so eloquently against the evils resulting from continued testing by the United States. Well, strontium-90 from Soviet bomb explosions also causes bone cancer; carbon-14 from Soviet bomb explosions also causes mutation of the genes.

The hypocrisy of the United States press and radio when they *now* headline these perils is infuriating; nevertheless, the danger to the health of the world is there. The consequence of an increase in radioactive fallout was before, and is now, death and deformity for innocent people everywhere and *any* government which is responsible for their spread is guilty of a horrendous crime against mankind.

That indictment includes the leading countries of the West and, in particular, the United States. For it can be argued that the Soviet Union was forced to resume testing because all its genuine efforts for peace were repelled by the NATO powers. There can be no real peace in the world without total disarmament. Yet when Khrushchev repeatedly offered a proposal for complete disarmament, *with a control and inspection system*, it was sneeringly dismissed as "unrealistic." A "realistic" policy for the West is the heating up of the Cold War, an accelerated armaments race, and continually edging to the brink of World War III.

A "realistic" policy is to distort and falsify the Soviet position in respect to the peaceful and just solution of the Berlin crisis, and to try to continue to rearm Germany so it will become the spearhead of the attack on the Soviet Union.

On every major point at issue between the United States and the USSR, the Soviet Union has been in the right—yet the Cold War gets hotter and the danger of annihilation grows. All this is true. There was, therefore, ample provocation for the resumption of testing by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, I think it was an inexcusable mistake. For the fact is that the superior moral position of the USSR was making headway. In spite of the lies and the distortions about Soviet aims and policies, the people of the world (with the exception of those in the United States) were beginning to understand the nature of the conflict between the two sides.

Certainly this was true of the colonial nations. They knew—and they showed it increasingly in their votes in the UN—who were the imperialists and who were their allies in their struggle for freedom.

There was clarity even on the Berlin question. The press and radio outside the United States were aware of the real

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issues and were frankly and openly on the side of a settlement along Russian lines.

It was becoming increasingly plain outside the United States that the Russian plea for total disarmament was not the Russian "trick" it was labelled here but a genuine offer. This was the biggest eye-opener—that whereas the capitalist system *needed* an arms race to keep it going, in the socialist system expenditures on arms were a complete waste.

The resumption of testing by the Soviet Union is defended on the ground that only a sudden show of extraordinary nuclear power would halt the war-makers and compel them to negotiate in good faith. That *may*, eventually, be the case; but right now something else has happened, something foretold by Khrushchev in a speech to the Supreme Soviet on January 14, 1960, on the possible consequences of the resumption of nuclear tests by any government: "This would trigger off again an unlimited race in the testing of nuclear weapons by any power and in any conditions." In less than one week after the Soviet announcement of the resumption of tests, President Kennedy announced a resumption of American tests (up to now underground, but for how long?).

In the jungle that is our world, it is argued, we can't expect socialist countries to use methods different from those used by capitalist countries. I don't agree. Socialists know that the capitalist system, in its very structure, is evil, so they don't expect rational, humane behavior from capitalist countries. But they have a right to expect such behavior from socialist countries. The resumption of testing is neither rational nor humane.

There are some things decent people do not do no matter how great the provocation, e.g. informing on their friends. In the same way, decent people, whatever the provocation, do not test bombs whose effect is to shorten the lives of many now living and make monsters of children not yet born.

The argument that Soviet testing was necessary for self-preservation is not convincing. The USSR already has enough bombs to destroy the United States and its allies. Why are more needed? The 100-megaton bombs they are getting ready now will completely devastate everything within a 300-mile radius: if one is dropped over St. Louis, it will wipe out Chicago. This

kind of weapon makes it more clear than ever that in thermo-nuclear war *there is no defense*. What kind of victory will there be for socialism—or capitalism—in a world all of whose inhabitants are incinerated?

The only solution is total disarmament. To the everlasting credit of the USSR, total disarmament has been its position, and still is. It is the responsibility of people everywhere—particularly people in the United States—to work day and night seven days a week to get their countries to accept this Soviet offer.

That's the answer to the question, "What can I do?"

(2) By Paul M. Sweezy

Explosion of nuclear weapons is a crime against humanity no matter when or by whom it is done. We have been taught that much more effectively by Soviet leaders than by our own. It was their arguments and actions which imposed a test moratorium on the atomic powers in the fall of 1958. As a result, their moral stature grew in the eyes of the world. Now that they have felt compelled by the logic of military arguments to resume testing, they cannot avoid paying a high price. The deadly chain reaction of competitive testing has once again been touched off, and no one knows whether or when it will again be brought under control. For their part in bringing about this somber development, the Soviet leaders must be—and must expect to be—held responsible. While the moratorium was in effect and at a time when the Soviet Union was pressing hard for its formalization in a test-ban treaty, Khrushchev himself warned that whoever might be the first to resume testing would assume a heavy responsibility to mankind. He was, alas, speaking the simple truth.

But when all this has been said, it must be immediately added that there is nothing more hypocritical or nauseating than the frantic effort of Western cold warriors to make moral and

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political capital out of the Soviet decision. When the moratorium was declared in 1958, the United States and Britain had set off nearly four times as many nuclear explosions as the Soviet Union,\* and the experts were unanimously agreed, then and later, that the United States held a substantial lead over the Soviet Union both in the variety and in the quantity of weapons possessed. The Soviet leaders were deliberately allowing themselves to be frozen into a position of inferiority in order to bring the atomic race to a halt. This was a courageous and moral act, but it is quite clear that its motivation must be sought elsewhere. The Soviet leaders evidently calculated—and they must have so argued to their skeptical military chiefs—that a cessation of the atomic arms race would give them the time in which to try to negotiate a settlement of the German question and to make a start toward genuine disarmament. If progress could be made toward these objectives, the Soviet Union's inferiority in atomic weapons would become less and less important and eventually, as the danger of nuclear war receded, would cease to matter. But if it should prove impossible to move forward along these lines, then obviously the Soviet Union could not continue indefinitely to accept a position of atomic inferiority. *From the very outset, the durability of the test moratorium was contingent upon the success of negotiations on Germany and disarmament.*

Eisenhower, alone among American political leaders, seems to have sensed this. In the Camp David talks with Khrushchev, he moved, tentatively and cautiously, toward a negotiated settlement of the German problem. And then the roof fell in—almost literally, in the form of a U-2 spy plane. Within a matter of months, the door to negotiation was slammed shut; and on taking office the new Kennedy administration immediately launched a fresh arms build-up. Soviet hopes for a German settlement ratifying the outcome of World War II faded; disarmament seemed farther away than ever. Meanwhile France, military ally of the United States and Britain, carried out its own series of nuclear tests, undeterred by the three-power moratorium and unembarrassed by outraged cries from Washington and London against the crime of atmospheric pollution.

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\* According to *Business Week*, the score was then United States—169, USSR—55, Britain—21.

One can now easily imagine what the Soviet military chiefs must have said to the government and party leaders: You made big concessions at the expense of Soviet defense capabilities, because you thought it would enable you to negotiate a reduction of the war danger. What happened? They insulted you and spat on you. They continue to claim all Germany for a government that represents the same monopolies that put Hitler in power. They are doing everything to reconstruct the military machine which cost 20 million Soviet lives in World War II. They will soon be giving Hitler's generals the atomic bombs they are itching to get their hands on. Your concessions, it appears, far from evoking corresponding concessions from their side, are interpreted as signs of weakness. Don't you think, comrades, that the time has come for the Soviet Union to look to its own strength and to talk to the imperialists in the only language they seem to understand?

From the point of view of the Soviet political leaders, there is simply no answer to this argument. All attempts to reach a German settlement or to make progress toward disarmament having been rebuffed,\* the entire justification for accepting a position of atomic inferiority disappeared. Faced with a similar situation, the political leadership of any country in the world would have been forced to the same conclusion. And when the Western policy-makers and propagandists, who were reluctantly pressured into the moratorium in the first place and then consistently refused to make any concessions on Germany or disarmament, now adopt an attitude of moral superiority because the Soviet Union was the first to resume testing, the only possible inference is that they have lost all sense of reality.

That this is indeed the case was decisively demonstrated by the attitude of the nonaligned powers whose conference at Belgrade opened immediately after the Soviet announcement of resumed testing. Let them condemn the Soviet Union as the enemy of mankind, screamed the moral Olympians of the West. But they did no such thing. And why? Surely not because of any lack of concern about the horrible dangers of renewed

\* That the Western powers have been primarily responsible for sabotaging disarmament efforts seems to us to be conclusively established by J. P. Morray in his new book *From Yalta to Disarmament: Cold War Debate*. See also his article below.

testing: the speeches at the conference left no doubt on that score. The reason is simply that the nonaligned powers *have* retained a sense of reality. They know that it is the West, and above all the United States, that is fanning the flames of militarism in Germany, propping up the remains of the colonial system, and refusing to enter serious disarmament negotiations. And they know, too, that as long as these policies are pursued there is no hope of containing the arms race. Hence their final declaration, as summarized by the *New York Times*,

avoided any condemnation of Russia for resuming tests, while asserting that an agreement on test suspension "should be urgently concluded." On nearly every other point of East-West controversy, the neutrals sided with Mr. Khrushchev. ("News of the Week," September 10, p. 1.)

The reason, shocking as it may seem to the great majority of Americans, is that, in the eyes of the great majority of mankind, the position taken by Mr. Khrushchev on these points of controversy is just and reasonable.

The resumption of nuclear testing is an exceedingly grave and ominous development. What it calls for from Americans, however, is not so much condemnation of the Soviet Union as an unprecedented effort to change their own government's foreign policy.

In September, 1957, William A. Williams, the distinguished University of Wisconsin historian, wrote an article for *MONTHLY REVIEW* entitled "Soviet Conduct and American Policy." In it he warned that

putting pressure . . . on Soviet leaders serves only to make them tougher at home and abroad. The final result may indeed be the collapse of the Soviet Union, but only in the context of a general nuclear war.

And he concluded that basically there were two and only two possible courses for the United States to follow in world affairs:

One alternative is to accept Secretary of State William H. Seward's understanding of the fact that "revolutions never go backward" and combine it with Secretary of State John Quincy Adams' insight that America's well-being depends upon "going not abroad in search of monsters to destroy." This would lead us to a moderate and balanced military policy in defense of a flexible

*modus vivendi*, and a willingness to accept and assist Soviet Russia's self-directed evolution away from centralized, coercive power. The other way is to drift or stride (and the former will become the latter) toward a nuclear showdown with Moscow.

With the resumption of nuclear testing the drift has become a stride with a vengeance. The policy of pressure which successive United States administrations have pursued ever since the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt is producing its inevitable results.

Must we follow this road to its bitter and disastrous end? Or is the United States still capable of changing course before it is too late? The fate of humanity quite literally depends on the answer to these questions. We can only hope that the resumption of nuclear testing will shock enough people, and especially enough Americans, into a realization of this absolutely unacceptable fact.

### WHAT KIND OF REFORM?

On paper, President Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress" program, as it was originally conceived and actually began to take shape at Punta del Este, looks good. The United States (hopefully with assists from the other advanced capitalist countries) is to provide \$20 billion of foreign aid to the Latin American countries over a period of ten years. The Latin American countries, for their part, are to enact necessary economic and social reforms and carry out far-reaching development schemes.

This program shows that American policy-makers have finally learned the lesson of Laos, Spain,\* Formosa, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, South Korea,\*\* South Vietnam, and other un-

\* How many Americans know that from 1953 to 1959 Spain received no less than \$15 billion in aid from the United States? For this and other little known facts about American policy toward fascist Spain, see the recent book of Arthur Whittaker, *Spain and Defense of the West*, written under a grant from the conservative Council on Foreign Relations.

\*\* For a picture of latest conditions in South Korea, see the article by Robert Casey which begins on page 271 below.

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fortunate victims of postwar United States foreign policy, namely, that foreign aid by itself merely serves to maintain the conditions and strengthen the regimes which are responsible for the *absence* of development. In the case of Latin America the grant of aid is to be conditional on the enactment of reforms. Instead of a mere bulwark of the status quo, foreign aid is thus to become both an instrument of reform and an engine of development. As a result, Latin America is to be stabilized, tranquilized, and in the long run saved from following Cuba down the primrose path of social revolution.

The only trouble with this attractive-sounding theory is that it won't work. And the reason why it won't work is that neither the oligarchies which rule Latin America nor the government of the United States have the slightest intention to promote or even allow the kind of reforms that are absolutely essential if healthy development is to be achieved south of the Rio Grande.

What makes us so sure? The answer is very simple: what has already happened in Cuba.

The official American theory is that the United States is opposed to the Castro regime because it is closely allied to the Soviet bloc. The truth is precisely the opposite. The Castro regime had to ally itself with the Soviet bloc in order to survive the implacable hostility of the United States. And the reason for that hostility is the agrarian reform and the nationalization of industry, measures without which the Cuban economy could never have been freed from the shackles of the past and set upon the road of progress. If the United States had been genuinely interested in Latin American development, and not in protecting the vested interests of North American corporations, it would have welcomed the Cuban reforms and granted generous assistance to facilitate their success. The result would have been an example and model for the rest of Latin America, and indeed for underdeveloped countries all over the world, to follow. And Castro would never have felt the temptation or the need to seek assistance from the Soviet bloc. Instead, the United States condemned the reforms, cut off even the trickle of aid that had been going to Cuba, and all but severed normal economic relations between the two countries.

We are not saying that Kennedy and his liberal advisers who drew up the blueprint of the Alliance for Progress are in-

sincere in their expressed desire for reform in Latin America. The important question concerns not their sincerity but the kind of reforms they want, and on this there is no lack of evidence to base an answer. They do *not* want reforms that result in a radical transformation of society's institutional and power structure. Cuba proves that. They *do* want reforms that they believe will improve the functioning of the existing system and make it more palatable to the exploited and underprivileged masses. A clear indication of what they have in mind was given by Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon in the course of a report to a Congressional committee on the results of the Punta del Este conference. Dillon, who led the United States delegation to the conference, singled out agrarian reform in Venezuela and fiscal reform in Argentina for special commendation. What is the nature of these reforms?

What has been done in Venezuela does not add up to an agrarian reform at all in the commonly understood sense of a transformation of socio-economic relationships in the countryside. What is involved is essentially a colonization scheme, an attempt to settle dwarf-holding or landless peasants on unused or newly opened lands without disturbing the existing system of landed property. Some temporary and partial relief of rural distress may be achieved in this way, though population increase, which is extraordinarily rapid in Latin America, can be counted upon to recreate the problem almost as fast as it is "solved." For the rest, settlement schemes may directly or indirectly promote the growth of a small class of relatively prosperous peasants; they can do little or nothing to raise the productivity or lower the exploitation of the vast majority of the rural population. It is surely an illusion to imagine that measures such as have been enacted in Venezuela can provide a sound agrarian base for economic development or check the rising revolutionary potential of the Latin American countryside.

Still less can be expected from the kind of orthodox monetary and fiscal reforms which have been adopted by the Frondizi government in Argentina under the combined pressure of the International Monetary Fund (acting as the agent of Wall Street and its European counterparts) and the local Argentine military establishment. Frondizi is a classic example of an all-too-familiar phenomenon, the left-wing politician who does the dirty

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work of the Right. Part of the dirty work in this case was to administer a severe dose of deflation to the economy after the collapse of the lopsided and ill-conceived development attempts of the Peronist era. The result was precisely what was to be expected under the circumstances: profound economic stagnation. In the period 1955-1960, industrial production in Argentina *declined* an average of 0.8 percent a year as against an average annual increase of 8.4 percent for Latin America as a whole and no less than 16.5 percent for Brazil.\*

Just why Mr. Dillon regards this performance with so much satisfaction is something of a puzzle. Can it be that he has forgotten that he has ceased to be a partner of Dillon, Read & Co. and is now the leader of an alliance which is supposed to have as its aim not profits but progress? Or is it perhaps that this new enterprise in international coalescence would be more appropriately named the Alliance for Profits?

The important thing, however, is not to explain Mr. Dillon but to understand him. What he is saying when he recommends to Latin America Venezuelan-type agrarian reform and Argentine-type fiscal reform is that all the talk coming out of Washington these days about the urgency of reform need not, indeed should not, be taken seriously. The message is not likely to be lost on the Latin American oligarchies. Their job, clearly, is now to churn out more reforms of the same kind and collect their billions. Washington's job is to pay the bill and hope for the best. Both might well make their own the famous motto of the French king, "Après moi le déluge." (September 20, 1961)

\* "Latin American Industrial Development, 1950-1960," *Comercio Exterior de Mexico* (monthly publication of the Mexican Banco de Comercio Exterior), July 1961, p. 3. This is not the place to analyze the Brazilian experience of the second half of the decade of the 1950's. Suffice it to say that the extraordinarily rapid increase of industrial production took place in a context of wild inflation and vast accumulation of foreign debts. During his brief tenure of the presidency, Janio Quadros apparently tried to be orthodox enough in his domestic economic policies to satisfy Wall Street and Washington and at the same time to retain his popular following through pursuit of a neutralist and pro-Cuban foreign policy. The bankers and the soldiers were evidently not satisfied, which left Quadros a choice of three courses: buckle under à la Frondizi, take the revolutionary path à la Cuba, or quit. He chose to quit. The resolution of the immediate political crisis over the succession—through the installation of Goulart with greatly reduced powers—settles none of the underlying issues. More, and perhaps bigger, crises are in store for Brazil.

## DISARMAMENT, GERMANY, AND TESTING

BY J. P. MORRAY

The renewal of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union has angered many in the United States who oppose the arms race, members of the variegated "Peace Forces" who had hitherto tacitly regarded the Soviet government as an ally in the campaign to achieve a test-ban treaty. They feel betrayed by the great power that was the first to call for a cessation of nuclear testing and the first to employ the promising tactic of a unilateral cessation as a means of mobilizing world opinion against governments that wanted tests to continue.

On the other hand, the September Conference of twenty-five nonaligned powers that began in Belgrade the day after the Soviet announcement, ended with a communique containing no criticism of the Soviet Union and generally adopting the Soviet approach to major world problems. Such a contrast suggests that American opinion on the issue is one-sided and unbalanced. Where the Soviet Union is concerned it is very difficult for American commentators to be objective. The gathering storm, the intensification of hostility, the sense of national emergency, the beginnings of mobilization, the proximity of war—a bad time to try to make objective comparisons between friend and foe, between "our" state and the enemy's. Nevertheless, the effort must be made.

The most diligent reader of the newspapers can fail to know what has been said and proposed by both sides in the disarmament negotiations. The complete or summary records of these negotiations, where the truth about the debate lies, have been published, but only after a sufficient time interval to assure that they will have no news value.

Yet it is impossible to form an accurate judgment on the attitudes of the parties to the negotiations without studying the arguments of both sides. As no jury should be allowed to

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Author of *Pride of State* and *From Yalta to Disarmament: Cold War Debate*, J. P. Morray is now writing a book on the Cuban Revolution. This article arrived from Havana on September 22.

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decide a cause in a law court simply on the statements of one of the lawyers, no American should conclude that the United States government wants to disarm from the simple fact that the Secretary of State makes self-serving announcements to the press corps. It is important to know the American arguments. It is just as important to know the Soviet arguments.

In an article of this length it is impossible to incorporate the texts of the documents that define the policies of the two major powers. I can only state some conclusions and refer the reader for further evidence to my book *From Yalta to Disarmament: Cold War Debate* (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1961) where the crucial phases of these battles of words are reproduced.

When World War II ended leaving the United States government with a monopoly of the atomic bomb, the American representatives in the United Nations responded to a 1946 Soviet proposal for a reduction of armaments with expressions of a fundamental opposition to disarmament agreements. Secretary of State Byrnes proclaimed the determination of the United States, taught by Hitler to expect aggression from dictatorships, to hold on to its arms into the indefinite future. The United States stood firmly on the right of the great powers, reaffirmed by the United Nations Charter just before the dawn of the atomic age, to maintain their military power in the name of collective security, each state deciding for itself the level and composition of its armed forces. A strong United States military force was an indispensable guarantee of peace. It would invite aggression by the Soviet Union for the United States to sign a treaty limiting its right to maintain and increase armaments that preserved the peace and security of the world. "World peace depends upon what is written in our hearts more than what is written in our treaties," Byrnes told the General Assembly. The Soviet Union, which preferred proletarian dictatorship to Western liberalism, was not to be trusted. A treaty with it would be a dangerous illusion, no substitute for the dominating military power conferred on the United States (by God's will, according to Churchill) in the form of the atomic bomb.

In the Baruch Plan the United States offered to transfer the bomb monopoly to an international policeman, certain to share the cardinal views of the United States government on the

Soviet Union. In return the USSR was to give up its independent right to develop atomic energy for peaceful, as well as military uses; and to open its territory to extremely broad rights of inspection by agents of an (anti-Communist) Atomic Development Authority. The defensive value of secrecy, which had just proved a military asset to the Soviet Union when attacked by Hitler, was to be surrendered.

Though the United States government continually points to Soviet rejection of the Baruch Plan as evidence of aggressive intentions, a more candid appraisal leads to the conclusion that the Plan was incongruous as a basis of coexistence, because it could have been used by a hostile Western coalition to wage peaceful warfare on Communism with legal weapons of inspection, restraints, and punishment behind the frontiers of the USSR. Soviet rejection of the Baruch Plan only proved that the Bolsheviks were not sufficiently intimidated by the Western bomb monopoly to surrender independence within their own sphere. They preferred the dangerous prospect of Cold War to the peace of permanent subordination to enemies likely to use their advantage with something other than Olympian detachment and scrupulous consideration for the Communists.

In lieu of the Baruch Plan the USSR proposed a treaty providing for the destruction of all existing atomic weapons and prohibiting their future use and manufacture. The United States was unwilling to lay down the new weapon considered so useful in the hands of the proposed world trustee, the puissant guarantor of peace and security on Western terms. The unwillingness of the USSR to accept the drastic control measures of the Baruch Plan or their equivalent caused the West to spurn the Soviet proposal as worthless, an offer of a mere paper promise from a godless and immoral state.

Thus closed the first round of negotiations over disarmament, leaving a wide gulf between the powers. Under pressure from world opinion, which is ever more apprehensive about the risks of world war in an arms race and ever more troubled by the continuing prior claim of military production on world capital resources, negotiations over disarmament have continued in a variety of forums through the years. The mounting pressure on the United States government from all over the world to move out of the Byrnes-type cynicism toward disarma-

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ment finally forced the State Department to paint one face of American policy, the face of diplomacy, with expressions of a will to disarm. This new line, which led to the creation of a United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1952, reflected a necessity felt daily by United States delegates. In the presence of representatives from neutralist states they confronted a Soviet bloc that could press relentlessly for disarmament because in objective conditions it had every reason to want a disarmament treaty. The United States began to negotiate over disarmament because the Soviet Union, playing on world opinion, forced it to. But of course such a decision to negotiate does not guarantee a will to reach agreement. Three high points in the negotiations offer evidence of the paralyzing ambivalence in American policy.

In 1955 the Soviet delegates put an end to a long deadlock over two problems: (1) the military force levels to be authorized under a disarmament treaty and (2) phasing the reduction in conventional armaments with the elimination of nuclear weapons. The USSR simply accepted Western proposals on these two vital points. Never was the dismay in Washington greater than that caused by this portentous advance toward a disarmament treaty. As the surprised administration picked itself up from this dangerous lurch toward a goal line that was also a precipice, a new study of the whole problem was begun by Mr. Stassen on orders of President Eisenhower. The State Department had been mousetrapped. The President's instructions were "to weigh the views of the military" as well as the views of civilian officials.

As a result of this restudy the United States "put a reserve" on all its earlier disarmament proposals. In their stead President Eisenhower came forward with his Open Skies proposal, postponing all further consideration of the reduction of armaments to such "confidence-building measures" as the exchange of military blueprints and unlimited aerial reconnaissance. The Soviets replied that these measures were acceptable in principle; they should be implemented as one of the concluding stages of an agreement *to reduce arms and prohibit nuclear weapons*, two problems President Eisenhower had put back on the shelf. The President's proposal satisfied the Pentagon, to whom it offered the exciting prospect of unlimited intelligence on targets within

the Soviet Union. It fixed the central line of American policy, which in more or less dissembled form is advocated year after year by the American delegates: controls first, effectively operating, before giving commitments to disarm. The Soviet Union is not likely to allow controls on such terms, so the dreaded commitment is safely pigeon-holed.

The second high point came in 1958 on the nuclear testing issue. The call to cease nuclear testing was first pressed by the Indian government, strongly supported by the Bandung Conference in 1955. The Soviet Union made this a formal proposal to the Western powers in May 1955, the cessation to be "supervised" by an international commission. The United States announced its willingness to give advance notice as to time and location of tests but declared that continued testing was necessary to maintain "the security of the free world."

In March 1958 the USSR electrified the world by announcing its decision "to discontinue unilaterally . . . tests of any kind of atomic and hydrogen weapons," not to be resumed unless the Western powers continued testing. The United States and Great Britain showed their rejection of the Soviet offer by carrying out tests already planned for the summer of 1958. But the bold and dramatic Soviet move made the British-American attitude all the more liable to attack, a serious point of weakness in the ideological struggle. As in 1952 it had been necessary to add a new face to American diplomacy (though without changing the substance of policy), now another such crisis had arisen. This one was met by proposing to let the technical experts talk about the problem of controls in an agreement on test cessation. These talks, however, were to be purely hypothetical, implying no commitment actually to cease testing, or, as the State Department expressed it, "without prejudice to the position of either state on the timing and interdependence of various aspects of disarmament."

The ambivalence in American policy was clearly demonstrated in the fate of the Geneva Experts Conference of July and August 1958. The experts met and agreed unanimously that an agreement to cease testing could be policed. They assumed a world-wide network of control posts, including approximately 20 in the Soviet Union. They assumed also that some on-site inspections of suspicious events would be allowed,

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enough to create the possibility of discovering violations, though certainty of discovery could not be guaranteed. As the conference dispersed, the world thought for a moment that dawn was actually beginning to appear on the horizon. This utopian optimism underestimated the resourcefulness of the American government in the necessary arts of duplicity. The society that has produced "industrial relations" and "public relations" will also be remembered for perfecting the diplomatic art of discovering new ways of postponing an unwanted agreement with specious reasons.

Within a few weeks the United States government had lost confidence in the Geneva Report of August 1958. It had come to accept the views of a group of scientists led by Dr. Edward Teller that underground explosions in the lower ranges could not be distinguished from earthquakes. Therefore all such explosions below a seismic threshold corresponding to approximately 20 kilotons (the size of the Hiroshima explosion) should be exempt from the test-banning treaty. By a happy coincidence it was in this range that the Department of Defense wanted more tests. The United States welcomed, however, those parts of the Geneva Report that contemplated setting up control posts and sending out on-site inspections. These ought to be set up as soon as possible and the on-site inspections begun, the more of them the better. Always looking for "control without disarmament," the United States treated the test ban negotiations as an opportunity to gain intelligence about the Soviet Union through substantial freedom of access to Soviet territory without giving up any weapons and without relinquishing the right to conduct tests, postponed perhaps while awaiting the end of a moratorium of one, two, or three years (the shorter the better, according to the American negotiators).

The most serious preoccupation of the United States government was the *de facto* suspension that began without agreement when negotiations opened in October 1958. World opinion was bound to be offended by a breach in this suspension. How to escape from this bind, how to resume testing without a damaging loss of credit with the neutral world was one of the nicest conundrums handed to the new administration by the departing Republicans. It was a well publicized fact that the administration was preparing in 1961 to resume testing, despite the diplo-

matic consequences. That it was the Soviet Union which threw away a long prepared diplomatic victory and rescued the United States from an almost certain rebuke by the General Assembly may seem paradoxical. In fact, it testified to the extreme gravity of the world situation, in which the real threat of nuclear warfare makes trivial a prospective propaganda victory. The slow, steady disclosure of United States hypocrisy on the testing issue was a tactic that had to be abandoned before it came to fruition, because evidence accumulated indicating that hot war and not cold war was on the agenda of the American government. The disadvantage of the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons testing was undoubtedly felt by Khrushchev to be a grave liability, more dangerous as war became more probable.

The third high point that stands out in the endless disarmament negotiations came in the 14th session of the General Assembly in September 1959. Prior to that time the problem of "control," the problem of verifying compliance with an agreement to reduce armaments, had divided the powers. In another dramatic move that pulled the rug from under those Western representatives who were resisting a treaty with this seemingly insoluble control issue, Premier Khrushchev presented his proposal for "general and complete disarmament" accompanied by any controls the Western powers desired. He accepted not only Open Skies, but Open Everything. He offered to let Western inspectors "exercise their zeal to the hilt," go anywhere, inspect anything, on a continuing basis, with aerial reconnaissance, mobile ground teams, and any other inspection techniques they cared to devise. All this, however, in exchange for general and complete disarmament. The West had wanted ample controls without commitments to disarm; the USSR had wanted commitments to reduce arms while stinting controls. Suddenly there was no more dispute over controls and the Western governments were brought face to face with the simple issue: dare we, like the Soviet Union, commit our states to disarm? They have continued to say, no!\* They have tried, however, to dissemble their refusal by recovering the control issue as a barrier to agreement. This is accomplished by calling for the establishment of

\* In the June 1960 issue of *Monthly Review* the author listed 14 reasons why the United States government, given its character and policies, has to answer, no!

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elaborate controls in return for commitments to take very minor steps in arms reduction, such as the dismantling of a certain number of nuclear weapons and shutting down "one by one" plants producing enriched uranium and plutonium. This is called "gradual disarmament" by the skillful sophists in the State Department. The Soviet rejection of these proposals is what reaches the American public. They are really diversionary, tactical devices to avoid the main issue, an actual commitment to disarm completely with *carte blanche* as to controls.

While evidence has accumulated that the United States government is resisting the consolidation of peace through disarmament, other signs point to a determination in the Kennedy administration to fight a war in Europe rather than accept the consequences of a peace treaty that would confer sovereignty on the German Democratic Republic. It is obvious that at some time the Western governments are going to have to face the question: shall we accept the permanent extension of the socialist world to the new frontiers created by World War II? For sixteen years they have refused to accept it and have fostered the conviction that they would never accept it. At the heart of the Acheson-Dulles-Adenauer policy is a determination to upset the *status quo* in Germany, to liquidate the German Democratic Republic, to recover East Germany (and perhaps parts of Poland) from the socialist world and incorporate them into the Western, anti-Soviet bloc. However one may feel about the German Democratic Republic, it is a reality defended by the power of the Soviet Union. The United States government cannot escape the decision, admittedly a hard one, to back down from its stern, crusading, liberating stance of the past sixteen years, or go to war. The threat of war is implied in every refusal of the United States government to accept the *de facto* frontier between the capitalist and socialist worlds. (This is one reason the United States government has had to resist commitments to disarm. A disarmed state can no longer threaten to win its goals by war.)

The Soviet Union is now pressing for a peace treaty that would greatly diminish the danger of war by declaring an agreement on frontiers and on the sovereign inviolability of the People's Democratic Republics. So long as the NATO powers refuse to agree to such a proclamation, they imply that the

situation in Eastern Europe is considered subject to change by NATO military campaigns; that the fate of Eastern Europe has not yet been settled; that the sixteen years of peace since 1945 have been only a period of truce while the NATO powers, waiting to see if the Soviet Union would withdraw voluntarily, used the time to assimilate German military strength; that World War II is still unfinished and that it may legitimately be resumed at any moment against whatever enemy stands in the way. The peace treaty would announce to the world that the hinted crusade of the capitalist armies has been cancelled and that peaceful coexistence between the socialist and capitalist states of Europe is to become a guiding principle accepted by all.

It is perfectly clear that the United States government does not want a settlement of World War II on such terms. It prefers the present situation, with its constant menace of resumed fighting, this time with German help, against a Soviet enemy, to the stabilizing effect of peace treaties. Such a policy makes the United States government an enemy of mankind. If it is persisted in, President Kennedy and his aides are marked for condemnation by history.

The Western governments have reacted to the Soviet peace initiative by increasing the military garrisons in West Berlin and fostering the false impression that the USSR has threatened a military attack against West Berlin. There are millions of readers of Western newspapers who believe that Khrushchev has threatened to take over Berlin by force, much as Hitler menaced Czechoslovakia with force in the conflict over the Sudetenland. Thanks to the lead from President Kennedy, they see in the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests, not a deterrent to Western plans to take over Eastern Germany by force, but a Soviet tactic for capturing West Berlin by "blackmail." The increase in the pace of war preparations initiated by Kennedy, the mobilization of 250,000 more men, the appropriation of six billion additional dollars for military expenditures, the dispatch of additional aircraft and troops to Europe, the highly publicized arrival of the Vice President with 1500 additional American troops in West Berlin, fanfare over the assignment of General Clay to Berlin as the President's Personal Representative to enhance the nation's "resources of judgment and action," all these have been tied together as defensive measures needed to

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deter a military attack on West Berlin. In fact, Khrushchev has said again and again that no one is going to attack West Berlin. The President is agitating American opinion against the USSR, muddying the possibilities of creating a more stable peace by falsifying Soviet policy, by creating spurious threats to win public support for increased Western military preparations that would otherwise meet resistance from a large segment of the public.

The closing of the border between East and West Berlin was a logical, necessary step in controlling the points of contact between a sovereign German Democratic Republic and a free West Berlin not subject to that sovereignty. The clear intention of this act was to treat West Berlin as a special area, not to threaten it with attack and absorption. Those who have expressed indignation at this effective marking of a frontier which all will be forced to respect, really object to inhibitions placed on expansion in the other direction. They were dreaming of seeing a capitalist West Berlin marching forth to draw all of East Germany into its bosom. It is this kind of dangerous dreaming which must be brought to an end. Controlling frontiers does not produce war; overrunning them does.

Implicit in the control over access routes, soon to be exercised by the East German authorities, is a right to blockade West Berlin, to starve it into surrender. But no one is threatening to do this, either. The East German authorities have proclaimed their willingness to give guarantees of respect for the economic ties between West Berlin and West Germany.

If war comes in such circumstances the conscience of millions of Americans cannot but be uneasy. This will in fact pose a painful moment of truth for American progressives. They cannot suppress their own secret judgment of American policy with the commandment: "Fear treason. Obey the commands of the state. This is the whole duty of man." Let the government take care not to count absolutely on a blind patriotism in this crisis. If the Western powers force war on a socialist bloc that has persistently offered reasonable terms of peaceful co-existence, complete and general disarmament, and peace treaties along *de facto* frontiers, then demoralization in the Western forces and tremendous moral strength in the socialist cause will not be long in showing their effects.

## WHERE I STAND

BY CHEDDI JAGAN

General elections in British Guiana on August 21 resulted in a solid victory for the Peoples Progressive Party under the leadership of Dr. Cheddi Jagan. The principle of complete independence has already been conceded by London, and Dr. Jagan, as the country's new Premier, is pressing for its immediate realization.

We publish below an excerpt from Dr. Jagan's last campaign broadcast, made on August 17th. Cheddi Jagan is a long-time subscriber to MR and a good friend. We know that he means exactly what he says, and we believe that under his leadership British Guiana will become an example and inspiration to underprivileged countries throughout the world. We congratulate Dr. Jagan, the Peoples Progressive Party, and the people of British Guiana, and wish them all success in the new period of struggle and achievement which is opening up before them.—The Editors

What, then, is the real reason behind the opposition to us?

It is because we are utterly opposed to the powerful, the privileged, the few. These great men know that our program includes reforms and far-reaching social changes. They do not want change. Why should they? For years they have enjoyed privileged positions in schools and churches, offices and clubs. They fear the competition from their less lucky brothers, which will come with lowered barriers. And so they fight against us. They have fought us now for twelve long years—and with some success.

Between them they defeated us in 1953 when British bayonets smashed our legally elected government and saved the great men's privileges. But violence only rallied our supporters to return us to the government when they got back the right to vote in 1957.

Our enemies changed their tactics then. They gave us office without power, plans and problems without money. They caused and fostered a racial split between the Africans and the Indians in our unhappy country. For four long years, they directed at our Party a press campaign of slander and abuse which for scurrility and dishonesty could hardly ever have been equalled.

Recently the United States of America has joined the battle

also. The imprint of McCarthy still lies heavy on that land. Events in Russia and in Cuba have deeply wounded their national pride and made their fear of Communism psychopathic. No wonder the great politician Aneurin Bevan wrote: "Fear of Soviet communism has led the United States and those who follow her lead to take a distorted view of the world situation and the forces which are at work in modern society." The slogan of our enemies is "The P.P.P. is Communist." They ignore the record of our acts and deeds, the laws we passed, the plans we have in hand. They shut their eyes and ears and scream "The P.P.P. is Communist." It paid good dividends. For money has flowed in like water. Books, pamphlets, posters, films have come pouring in from the United States—all aimed against us.

They work on your emotions—these enemies of ours. They try to frighten you about the future. Well, cast your memories back. As the colonial peoples rose to freedom, have not their leaders always been dubbed Communist? Were not Nehru, Khrushchev, Sukarno, Sekou Toure, Jomo Kenyatta, Lumumba, *all* called Communists? This is an illustrious company. If these are Communists, then I take my place beside them gladly.

Calling patriots bad names is no new thing. It is a custom as old as history. Roundheads, Levellers, Chartists, Republicans all received abuse. The American colonists found this out in 1775, before ever there was a *Communist Manifesto*. Then an English judge formed a society for "The Protection of Property against Levellers and Republicans."

Let me say this to those who try to frighten you. *I do not propose to establish any form of dictatorial regime in British Guiana.* I believe in, and will cherish, parliamentary democracy with its expression of the people's will at regular free elections. I stand by the provision of the new Constitution by which the fundamental rights of all, including freedom of conscience, and religion, and expression are protected by the courts. Indeed these provisions were inserted into the new Constitution at the request of my Party and for my people.

Now my friends. You must recognize what is happening. All this talk of Communism, all the bitter racial feelings are but the weapons of our enemies designed to make you split the vote.

Understand clearly that if, through prejudice, fear, or loyalty to any individual, you vote against the P.P.P.—*you vote*

*against your country.* For only we can get the absolute majority needed. If you split the vote, we end with three separate parties, none of which can govern, and the imperialists will have won a further respite.

At both the past elections, our enemies conducted a similar smear campaign against us. You were not fooled then, and you voted for us. I am confident you will not be fooled today. Finally, in this last broadcast on the eve of the most important election in our history, I will repeat that which I have said so often. *I believe that my first charge is to raise my people from the mire of poverty in which, for too long, they have suffered.* In this great project I will look for help wherever I can find it. We reserve to ourselves the absolute right to get assistance wherever we can and from whomsoever the offer comes. This however we guarantee, that such aid will be taken whether from the United States, Britain, or Russia without committal of any sort. Our new found freedom is, to us, too dear, to be bartered even for the bread our people need.

I have never made any secret of my views. I have been thrown out of office. I have been subjected to violence, indignity, and jail. I am willing to face these things again, and gladly, in the fight to free my people and to aid them.

Here I stand. Here will I stand until I die. It is for you on Monday, to decide whether you will stand beside me.

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#### WEAPONS COST AND WELFARE

<i>Military items</i>	<i>Approx. cost in millions</i>	<i>Welfare equivalent</i>
Bomber (B-70)	\$15-20	500 school classrooms
Destroyer	27	9 school buildings
Atlas missile, nuclear power	1.5	3 libraries
Nuclear powered submarine	47-50	10 hospitals
Aircraft carrier Forrestal class	214	Could double amount now spent annually by U.S. government for all medical research
Guided missile cruiser	158	15,800 dwelling units in modern housing projects

—*Economic Notes, Labor Research Association, April 1959*

## HAS CAPITALISM CHANGED?

BY JOAN ROBINSON

This question, posed by Professor Tsuru to a symposium of economists\*, implies that we knew quite well what capitalism was formerly like. We know, certainly, that it was capable of producing the 1930's. But it was also capable of producing long runs of rapid growth, interrupted by only minor recessions. Ever since the eighteenth century, the industrial revolution has been going off like an irregular string of firecrackers. Taking a long view, we might consider growth to be the most characteristic feature of capitalism. It would be possible to describe the spectacular development now going on in Japan and Germany as a steep climb to make up the arrears of war and defeat; France and North Italy may be seen as catching up on arrears of relatively slow industrialization over a century or more. The present relatively sluggish growth of the United States and Great Britain can be seen as a plateau reached by the leaders in a climb.

More narrowly stated, the question posed for discussion is whether a major depression can occur again.

Certainly the world has changed, in our lifetime, in two relevant respects. The thirties did happen, and some lessons were drawn from that experience. What Keynes called the "humbug of finance" is extremely tenacious of life (especially in the United States), but it can never be quite what it was. In principle, the doctrine that governments have a responsibility for avoiding slumps is now orthodox. This might prove a broken reed if it were not for the second change—the emergence of a powerful socialist bloc which is itself immune from depressions.

This proves to have a stabilizing effect on capitalism in three ways. First, the extent of fluctuations is limited by the very fact that part of the trading world is excluded from them.

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\* *Has Capitalism Changed?* Edited by Shigeto Tsuru. Contributors: John Strachey, Paul Sweezy, C. O. Bettelheim, Y. A. Kronroad, Maurice Dobb, Paul Baran, J. K. Galbraith. Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo 1961.

The book can be ordered from Monthly Review at the list price of \$4.

This does not operate to any great extent through direct exports from capitalist to socialist countries (though these are quite important for particular industries). It works, and may be expected to do so increasingly, through the support which sales to the socialist world give to the incomes of primary producers, mitigating the vicious spiral of declining trade that follows from a fall in imports from them, with a consequent fall of their power to purchase.

Second, the capitalist world feels itself to be on trial, and the governments which have pledged themselves to maintaining economic stability have been given a powerful motive for trying to keep their word.

Finally, rivalry itself promotes expenditure. The cold war provides an excuse for expenditure on arms—the least harmless way of keeping up employment by “digging holes in the ground” but the one most acceptable to orthodox opinion. Fortunately, this is not the only form in which rivalry manifests itself. Aid to underdeveloped countries (even if, as Paul Baran argues, most of it goes down the drain in corruption and luxury) is a better way of consuming the surplus. There can be little doubt that more aid is inspired by rivalry with the socialist world than would ever have come from pure benevolence.

The influence of the socialist sector of the world on the capitalist sector is not much stressed in this volume, and most of the contributors are skeptical of the possibility of maintaining employment by government action. All the same, they do not seem to have made out a case that *depression* will come again. There is a general haziness in the whole argument as to whether it is concerned with a slump or with long-run stagnation. Current American experience seems to be that slumps are very mild. The trouble is that booms are mild also. Each recovery leaves a larger gap between actual and potential output than the one before.

Tsuru regards the rapid rate of technological progress now being experienced as a helpful factor. Here there is a missing link in his argument, which Paul Sweezy picks up. Tsuru, thinking in terms of Keynes and Schumpeter, regards inventions as opening up new profitable investment opportunities and so providing the offset to saving necessary to fend off depression. As Sweezy points out, this misreads the situation. Technical pro-

gress is not an occasional "random shock" that sets investment going but a continuous built-in propensity in the modern industrial system. "The big corporations have enormous sums of money accruing to them in the form of depreciation quotas which are naturally available for investment in the latest machines and processes. Under these circumstances, it is obvious that a high but carefully regulated rate of technological innovation is compatible with a low or even zero rate of *net* investment and hence with a chronically depressed economy." (P. 84.) Tsuru has put technical progress in on the wrong side of the account. To keep the economy at stretch, output must rise in the proportion that output per man is rising, on top of the proportion in which the labor force is growing. With less technical progress, employment would be easier to maintain.

The other possibility of alleviation that is proposed for discussion is a greater equality in the distribution of income, which (in Keynesian language) might make up for a flagging inducement to invest by a rising propensity to consume. Professor Bettelheim stoutly denies that consuming power can rise even in proportion to productivity (this seems to arise from the usual confusion between a constant rate of exploitation and a constant level of real wages). Professor Galbraith appeals to his theory of countervailing power and Mr. Strachey to the softening effect of democracy upon capitalism. These arguments are good enough to show (as against Bettelheim) that the share of wages need not fall as output per head rises. But to be efficacious, it is not enough for the rise in consumption per head to keep up with the rise in productivity. It has also to rise sufficiently to take over the slack from any reduction in net investment per head.

Merely to maintain effective demand for labor, the demand for commodities has to increase in proportion to output per head. This requires that the overall level of money wage rates should rise, or that prices should be cut. In ideal competitive conditions (such as never existed outside the elementary textbooks), prices fall (relatively to money incomes) when surplus capacity appears, and so stimulate demand till capacity outputs can be sold. Competition was never so perfect, even in "the good old days," and certainly under the modern regime of administered prices there is no reason to expect profit margins to

be cut in the manner that the textbook case requires. Nor can the trade unions erode margins from below by raising money-wage rates, since there is no better excuse than a rise in wage rates for putting prices up (an excuse often used to raise prices more than proportionately, so that margins actually rise and purchasing power is curtailed).

Moreover, the very progressiveness of taxation, which is the pride of democracy and the vehicle of countervailing power, works against expansion. The great oligopolistic firms, with proper prudence from their own point of view, fix margins which give a "break-even point" at considerably below capacity—that is, full costs including standard profit are covered by sales when a large margin of productive capacity is idle. An upswing in demand then causes a huge shift to profit, for all sales above the break-even point are pure gain. The taxes which the profits attract have to be withheld from distribution by the firms before they are spent by the government. The upswing therefore comes to rest, and it may do so well before capacity is reached. The firms then see no advantage in building up capacity further. It seems as though the built-in stabilizers designed to keep fluctuations within bounds have been only too successful. They work in such a way as more or less to stabilize total output. Meanwhile, technical progress goes on raising output per head, and the manpower required to produce a given output goes on falling.

The problem has slipped out of the framework of Keynesian analysis. It might have been better to pose the question the other way round. Instead of asking whether capitalism has changed for the better, in the sense that it has become immune to short-run depressions, one could ask whether capitalism has changed for the worse, in the sense that it has become incapable of long-run growth.

It would be easy to make a case for an affirmative answer to the latter question. Nineteenth-century capitalism was an expanding system in the literal sense. It did not have to keep itself suspended by the bootstraps of its inner dynamism; it had its feet planted on new lands to be peopled, full of natural wealth to be exploited. There is much force in Rosa Luxemburg's prediction that when capitalism can no longer expand geographically it will not know what to do with itself.

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Moreover, for private enterprise the main problem is not to produce, but to sell. Old-style capitalism had a ready-made market. The world was not naked before mills were built in Lancashire. The mill products could undersell the handloom weavers and take the market from them. And they had the hand-loom weavers of the whole world to ruin before they began to meet competition from their own kind. Even now the spectacular increases of production in Japan and Germany are not all (as we in Britain know only too well) a net addition to the production of the world. Perhaps from the first, capitalism has been sawing off the bough that it was sitting on and all that has really changed is that we have begun to notice how deep the saw has gone.

There is another aspect to the ever-growing productivity of industry that is germane to the discussion. Productivity grows on a narrow front—in physical goods that lend themselves to mass production. Even if incomes grew with productivity, consumers could not be found for the output; they want to spend their growing purchasing power on other things. (Galbraith would have done better to draw upon his *Affluent Society* for a contribution to this volume rather than from his earlier and more soothing work.) This very fact to some extent relieves the situation that it creates. Regular industry cannot find markets to keep output rising as fast as output per head, but the redundant workers can largely find a livelihood in providing services to meet the purchasing power deflected from industry. It seems as though, over the very long run, capitalism reverses the process with which it began, of taking the market from craftsmen and petty traders and absorbing their families into its labor force. Now it is spewing them out again and at the same time creating a market in which they can flourish. The robots of automated industry are eroding the labor force, and small-scale traders and self-employed professionals are proliferating to take its place. Engels' joke about England developing a bourgeois working class is coming true in earnest in the United States.

The argument has slipped out of the Marxist framework also. Capitalism has "ripened the productive power of social labor" with a vengeance, but what has happened to the proletariat that was to take it over?

Meanwhile socialism has come into being just in those countries that missed the capitalist bus. The tough, disagreeable aspects of socialism, which have so much weakened its idealistic appeal, are due precisely to this fact. Instead of expropriating the expropriators and settling down to civilized ease, the revolutionary governments had to lay upon their people hard tasks and curb their disillusion by bitter means.

It seems that neither the Keynesian nor the Marxian prognosis of the future of capitalism is being fulfilled and we are left without any particular theory as to what will happen next.

The contributors to this volume discuss, with varying degrees of optimism, the prospects of a peaceful transition to socialism within the capitalist countries.

The notion that a new Great Depression is soon to come and that some kind of socialism will emerge from the struggle to fend it off, smacks somewhat of wishful thinking. The slow drift into stagnation that appears to be taking place does not come to a dramatic crisis that calls forth dramatic remedies.

One thing seems fairly clear—private enterprise has ceased to be the form of organization best suited to take advantage of modern technology. Planning of investment to give automated production the long runs that it needs; a high priority for education to raise up a generation which can develop its potentialities; equality of opportunity, to waste no scrap of talent worth training; an adequate distribution of purchasing power to consume the product; increasing leisure to turn redundancy of labor into an advantage—these are what the new technology demands and what socialist economies can supply. There is certainly one way in which capitalism has changed—it is no longer clearly the most effective type of economic system ever known.

In England, we have learned to realize that we are no longer running the world. Given peace and freed from the burden of armaments (for we have no need just yet to dig any holes), it is easy to imagine us muddling through in some kind of semi-planned welfare state—not socialism but capitalism without its claws. Tsuru suggests that something of the kind might be possible also in Japan. But what about the United States? Just at the moment, public opinion in America seems to be taking up the attitude of the wrong mother in the judg-

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ment of Solomon—rather blow the world up than allow someone else to lead it.

Until that mood passes, there is nothing else worth discussing, but when it does (I will not write if) a new chapter will begin, and there seems no very clear indication to make it obvious that capitalism will not have a long future as the second best economic system in the world.

### THE MILITARY COUP IN SOUTH KOREA

BY ROBERT D. CASEY

To understand last spring's military take-over in South Korea, the factional power struggle now going on, and the inevitable civil war looming in the background, it is necessary to review chronologically the events leading up to the military coup and its immediate aftermath.

The primarily student revolt which overthrew the incredibly corrupt and dictatorial Rhee regime on April 19, 1960, had no political orientation or program of its own. To the youthful students (many of them from the high schools) it was virtually a choice of being for Good and against Evil; they were politically naive to the point of self defeat. However, after wholesale bloodshed on the streets of the principal cities, they did bring down the Rhee government. This paved the way for the ascension to power of Premier John M. Chang and his group of reformers.

Whatever the shortcomings of the Chang government may have been, it was the closest thing to a democratically elected body of legislators that South Korea had yet known. Once in

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office, Premier Chang did set in motion reforms intended to placate the students and intellectuals, and to allay peasant dissatisfaction. Some corrupt politicians were arrested and charged with thefts of various kinds; some measure of political freedom was granted to the opposition parties, meaning primarily the socialist parties. (In the subsequent general election these parties amassed a surprisingly large vote, despite the virtual absence of any real campaign funds, and the handicap of having had many of their leaders just released from the political prisons). Also, existing restrictions on the press, the trade unions, and student organizations were relaxed. A good many foes or critics of the Rhee regime were released from jail. However, all of these actions were but breaches in the dam, so carefully built and kept up by Syngman Rhee, which had successfully isolated the South Koreans from all liberal or leftist thought. And, as has always been the case in the past, the more freedom the people got the more they wanted. Papers and periodicals for the dissemination of information sprang up everywhere. These in turn triggered off politically dormant groups and led to a wave of trade union organizing.

Meanwhile, over in Japan, the powerful leftist organization of Korean Residents of Japan (called the Chosen Soren) held mass rallies and demonstrations demanding reunification talks with the North Koreans. In South Korea itself the student organizations now began to arrange for the interchange of student groups with their counterparts in North Korea. In the view of many informed observers, this was actually the event that decided the military junta to stage its coup. The last thing in the world the ROK military hierarchy intends to permit is for the South Korean college students to travel to North Korea and contrast the results of a planned socialist society with the chaos, corruption, and incredible poverty existing in their own home land. Economics talks a political language of its own, and it is impervious to propaganda.

Premier Chang's failures in the economic field were his greatest weakness. Since the end of the Rhee period the cost of living had risen some 30 percent, with the hardest hit being the farmers themselves. In the countryside "spring hunger" is present every year, but under Chang it was the worst in many years. The Minister of Agriculture officially reported that 1,170,-

#### MILITARY COUP IN SOUTH KOREA

000 people were suffering from "an acute shortage of food." This was generally believed to be a conservative estimate. Chronic unemployment went virtually unchecked, with some three million out of work completely and one million of these officially classified as "hungry." (In the free enterprise stronghold of South Korea there exists no such "creeping socialist" institution as unemployment insurance. It is a simple case of "no work no eat.")

The phenomenal rise of the socialist parties in South Korea and their impressively large popular vote, led to articles in even the conservative Japanese papers (which keep a close watch on all Korean events), and these parties' scheduled unification talks (aimed at presenting a common front in the next general election) aroused the speculation that a neutralist South Korea could arise in the not too distant future. Needless to say, these storm signals rang all the warning bells installed in the ROK military minds, for it seemed that the very basis of their whole system and careers was being challenged. It was.

So on May 16th, some 3,000 or 4,000 troops moved in on the government positions in Seoul and affected the downfall of Premier John M. Chang's government. UN General Carter B. Magruder, of the United States, originally played down or opposed the military coup (the United States Army used its own radio station in South Korea to voice protests, in the Korean language, against the coup), but when the chips were really down there was no one prepared to fight to uphold the elected government. By 9 a.m., Lt. General Chang Do Young (no relation to Premier Chang) had imposed martial law upon the whole country (halting all air line flights, closing all the harbors, establishing complete press censorship, imposing a new curfew), ordered the dissolution of the National and the Provincial Assemblies, and issued orders for the arrest of the entire Chang cabinet along with their deputies. By 8 p.m. that evening the government of Premier Chang had ceased to exist, and the Premier himself was in hiding.

The military junta now in power was not long in revealing its true nature. It proved to be ultra-reactionary, based upon a program of extreme nationalism and sterile anti-Communism. It was, in fact, the Far Eastern equivalent of a fascist state, perhaps the forerunner of others to come.

The Japanese press, on the whole, accurately analyzed the

military coup as a "preventive revolution" (using *Sankei Shimbun's* terminology), the ROK military moving before the students, the newly awakened labor unions, the many socialist parties, and the intellectuals could form a common front to challenge the ruling oligarchy in Seoul. Premier Chang had intended to reform the worst abuses of the society he ruled, nothing more. These new forces in the political arena intended to replace it entirely.

On May 18th, ex-Premier Chang emerged from hiding and in a nationally broadcast message took full personal responsibility for his country's three-day crisis and its many ills. This speech reminded many politically sophisticated listeners of similar abject self-accusations staged in Communist countries by deposed figures when a new faction takes over power.

Among the earliest victims of the junta was Lt. General Lee Han Lim, commander of the powerful First Field Army, which had failed to back the coup in the beginning. He was also considered to have been unduly influenced by General Magruder (who in turn was soon replaced in his UN command and returned to the States).

Back in America itself, the original opposition to the coup of the ROK military was now in the process of changing, as indicated by the statement of Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in which he said that he was encouraged by the policy pronouncement just issued by the Korean generals stating that they intended to stamp out corruption and Communism, but not to create a lasting military dictatorship.

Lt. General Chang Do Young now issued a 9-point economic declaration for the military junta ordering a strict ban on all further labor disputes and freezing wages as of May 15th (the day before the takeover). It also went on to tell retail merchants to maintain the prices of daily commodities at the May 15th level and sternly warned against speculation. A death penalty was passed for the crime of smuggling.

Now a sweeping wave of arrests put in jail all the political opposition that could be caught. Over 3,000 people, as close as anyone could estimate, were rounded up by the military in this purge. The majority of these opposition figures were from the leftist ranks, socialists and trade union militants. Especially hard

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hit was the journalist profession and the teachers. The radical teachers union of Pusan was cleaned out.

At his first press conference, Lt. General Chang Do Young said that the military junta planned a stern crackdown on what he termed "pro-Communist elements working in the guise of progressives." When a reporter questioned him about the students' movement, with its plans for interchanging groups with North Korean colleges, General Chang snapped, "The students must return to their campuses and study harder."

The Japanese Socialist Party, very close to the scene and conversant with Korean conditions, now issued a statement predicting that the measures being taken by the ROK military junta would afford no real solution to the "deep-seated economic and social illness of that country," but instead would only "make things worse." The Japanese Socialists went on to say that in their opinion the military coup in South Korea was part of a "scheme" on the part of the United States to strengthen its anti-Communist position in the peripheral areas of the East-West struggle, following its "failures in Cuba and Laos." They apparently believed that the CIA had had more than a little to do with the military coup in South Korea.

On May 21st, the new cabinet of South Korea was sworn in, the oath of office stressing patriotism, friendship with allies, anti-Communism, and the building of the nation's economic strength. Virtually the entire government was now composed of ROK Army officers.

On May 22nd, the new government officially announced the dissolution of all political parties and social organizations (including, presumably, the labor unions). To all intents and purposes these had been closed anyway, following the mass arrests of their leaders. The names of some of those caught in the police dragnet were now released: prominent among them were Chang Kuen Sang, a top socialist figure, and Cho Yong Soo, the publisher of the socialist-supported newspaper *Minjok Ilbo*. They were officially charged with helping the Communist campaign for the "peaceful unification" of the divided country. National Police Director, Brig. General Cho Heung Mau, announced that 2,014 political suspects were being detained as well as some 3,000 hoodlums. The breakdown of political detainees showed that 546 teachers had been arrested, 70 student

leaders, 606 members of the opposition in the political field (especially socialists), 256 from various social organizations, 14 newspapermen, and some 522 others (including many trade union figures).

The military junta now moved to alleviate the desperate condition of the farmers and the fishermen. It froze huge sums of private high-interest loans that had been collecting as much as 80 percent interest in a single year, and ordered all fishermen or farmers to report to the authorities their private debts that had an annual interest rate of over 20 percent.

A trial held in Seoul pointed up the drastic anti-Communist position of the new government. The Kwangju District Court sentenced to death five men for plotting to hijack a ferry boat and flee with it to North Korea.

On May 28th, the military junta officially abolished 76 newspapers and some 305 news agencies. Figures now revealed that of the 252 news agencies operating in Seoul during the life of the John M. Chang government, 241 had been closed down. All 64 of the news agencies outside of the capital were now closed tight. And the few publications still running in Seoul were operating under the strictest of military censorships.

Meanwhile, arrests of political and business figures, men formerly prominent in the regimes of Syngman Rhee or John M. Chang, continued unabated. Some 25 major personages were now in jail awaiting trial on charges of every type of corrupt practice or misuse of office. The fortunes that had been made often ran into the millions in United States dollars (one amounted to \$75 million).

On June 6th, South Korean Maj. General Pak Chung Hi publicly announced that he had uncovered a Communist conspiracy high in the Government of deposed Premier John M. Chang. Among those implicated were former Finance Minister Kim Yung Sun, who was charged with being in the direct pay of the Communists in North Korea, and two of his associates.

The military junta now promulgated a so-called Emergency Law of National Reconstruction, to replace the suspended constitution. It gave the junta virtually carte blanche in all fields.

On June 9th, the junta continued its crackdown on professors and students, ordering them to stay out of all political activities and out of the labor unions. A press release at this

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time charged the student organizations with being infiltrated with Communists, pro-Communist ideas, and neutralist ideas. The ROK junta also invited Korean school teachers now residing in Japan to return to South Korea to be "re-educated in anti-Communist principles, revolutionary pledges, and national culture." There was no noticeable movement of teachers back to South Korea.

The junta then arrested the first member of its own group, Lee Pil Suk, the governor of the state-owned Industrial Bank, charged with making a huge loan to one of 29 other persons under arrest on charges of corruption. On July 3rd, the power struggle that had been going on within the junta broke out into the open with the resignation of Lt. General Chang Do Young from his chairmanship of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction and his replacement by Maj. General Pak Chung Hi. Some 40 other generals and admirals were now retired from active duty, thus effectively breaking up the Chang Do Young faction. Maj. General Pak Chung Hi now appeared to be the undisputed ruler of South Korea.

On July 4th, former Premier John M. Chang and seven of his ministers were officially charged with collaborating with the Communists. Also charged with collaboration with the Reds were the former prosecuting general, the former director of the mint, and eight ex-members of the Assembly, including the Speaker of the House. One of the specific counts against ex-Premier Chang was that he had contributed one million hwan to an organization of families of men who were slain by the South Korean authorities as alleged Communists during the hysteria-packed days of the Korean War. Virtually no informed observer in Seoul took these charges seriously, as John M. Chang was well known to be a devout Catholic, had been educated in the West, had strong sympathies and ties with the United States, and possessed a record of opposition to real Communists. But no one expected this to make any real difference. Under the rules of procedure in force today under the junta, the charges of pro-Communist sympathies are almost irrefutable. At most, Chang was guilty of trying to democratize South Korea and of holding a few liberal opinions of his own.

On July 10th, ex-Lt. General Chang Do Young was officially accused of supporting a plot to assassinate Maj. General Pak

Chung Hi and of seeking United States military aid to suppress the May 16th coup. Some 43 other officers were included in the indictment. In the charges, Chang was specifically accused of asking UN General Carter B. Magruder to use his American troops in South Korea to suppress the revolution. (General Magruder himself was not available for comment as he had been replaced in his UN command on June 30th and was now in the States.) The size of the group arrested came as a distinct surprise and shock to military circles in Seoul. None now felt safe, no matter how highly placed. The Army's once solid front was now broken completely, factional rivalry and loyalty was the order of the day. In the economic field near-paralysis gripped the country; private investment and loans were suspended; and it was thought that even large-scale United States emergency aid might not be enough to do more than buy a few months' breathing space for the junta.

In summary, one can say that the present ROK military junta, headed by Maj. General Pak Chung Hi, is both extremely reactionary and extremely unstable, with no apparent economic program worth talking about. In fact the whole "free enterprise" philosophy it has been so successfully sold by its American mentors prohibits the type of long-range planning that alone could save South Korea from economic collapse. The South Korean leaders have become, in every sense of the phrase, "victims of their own propaganda." The economic reforms they visualize or speak about are little more than stop-gap measures designed to buy a bit of time. Massive United States aid could forestall the crisis awhile, but not for long. Time has simply run out in South Korea.

Another student-peasant uprising will occur; it will have a political orientation left of center; and South Korea will go Left, probably into a neutralist world position. How soon this will occur is anyone's guess, but another severe season of "Spring Hunger" could well trigger it off next year—if it doesn't come before.

## WORLD EVENTS

*By Scott Nearing*

### Break-Through on the Left

PPP (Peoples Progressive Party) is a symbol that has dominated the political consciousness of British Guiana during the past dozen years. It represented a hope for better living during its infancy. It stood for "victory" in the 1953 election, until it was smashed by the British navy later that same year. Again it stood for victory in the elections of 1957 and 1961. Today the leader of the PPP, who is Prime Minister of British Guiana, is pledged to demand immediate and complete independence of the British Empire.

Two noteworthy features mark the rise of the PPP. The first is its tireless campaign to let the people of British Guiana know the facts of present-day economic and political life, and to hold up the ideals of socialism as the logical goal of popular struggle in this power age. The second noteworthy feature is the dedication of PPP to legalism and gradualism. Surrounded by the same under-employment, poverty, disease, technical backwardness, and foreign domination that are the curse of so many South American peoples, PPP leaders have chosen to operate within the restrictions imposed by a contradictory mixture of representative government and majority rule at home and political-military domination by a foreign occupying power.

The decisive PPP victory in the election of August 21, 1961 presents the peoples of Central and South America with alternative routes out of colonialism through independence into socialism. One is the insurrectionary path followed in Cuba by the 26th of July Movement. The other is the path of revolution within the law followed by the PPP in Guiana.

### Anti-Communism Costs Billions

Nearly three years have passed since President Fulgencio Batista was defeated and driven from Cuba by the 26th of July Movement headed by Fidel Castro. The military odds were strongly against Castro and his poorly equipped guerrillas. Popularity odds were overwhelmingly in his favor.

During every minute since January 1, 1959, Cuba and

its new leadership have been a headache for Washington and other Batista collaborators. Washington first expected and then hoped that Castro would climb down from his revolutionary high-horse and play ball with Wall Street and the State Department. Castro went on with his revolution. Within two years he had not only stood up to the United States and built a solid following among Cuban workers, farmers, and intellectuals, but he had become a mythical hero to millions of people all over Latin America.

Washington tried diplomatic pressure on Cuba, then economic sanctions, then sabotage, and finally in April, 1961, armed invasion. Castro not only kept going, but he seemed to get stronger with each blow directed against him and his regime.

Washington sponsored a conference of the Organization of American States in 1960. The conference was called to outlaw the Castro government. It adopted a resolution which condemned outside interference in the internal affairs of American States.

After the disastrous failure of the Washington-engineered Cuban invasion in April 1961, the State Department proposed another general O.A.S. conference for the late spring or early summer, which would take anti-Castro action. Such a conference would be called, Washington announced, only if a two-thirds anti-Castro majority was assured in advance of the meeting. The conference was never held.

Instead, an O.A.S. meeting was called in Uruguay for mid-August, 1961. It was to be the coming-out party for the Alliance for Progress. The conference was held on schedule. President Kennedy did not attend. Instead he was represented by Treasury Secretary Dillon. Prime Minister Castro did not attend either. Instead, he sent Economics Minister Che Guevara. Dillon with twenty billions in his attaché case met with respect. Bearded Guevara stole the show. He was sought out, photographed, interviewed, quoted. President Kennedy, aiming to buy out Latin America for cash, had set his sights high. For all of the American Republics, from 1945 to 1959, United States aid totalled only \$2.7 billion. By comparison, twenty billions was big money.

Latin American economic ministers and governments are desperately in need of cash and capital goods. They are eager

to accept both, even from Uncle Sam, but they are so bitterly opposed to interference in the internal affairs of any Latin American nation that even twenty billions could not buy an anti-Cuban declaration at the 1961 O.A.S. conference.

### The Food Gap in India

India provides the most extensive population area of destitution, misery, and degradation in our experience. In India hundreds of thousands of people live by the roadside in the country and on the streets and sidewalks of cities—homeless, emaciated, in hopeless resignation.

Several explanations are offered for this searing poverty. One is neglect of the land with correspondingly low productivity. Deforestation, soil erosion, and the waste of water lay the basis for food deficiency. Backward agricultural techniques complete the picture.

A second explanation is a population increase of 1.8 per cent each year. During the three Indian five year plans ending in 1966, 80 million people will have been added to India's population. To feed these added multitudes will require an increase of 700,000 tons of food grain per year. Similar outlays will be necessary for housing, transportation, education.

Four simple steps will help to meet the Indian food gap:

- (1) Better use of lands now under cultivation: fertilizers, seed selection, tillage, more intensive farming.
- (2) Improvement of sub-marginal lands. Reforestation, prevention of erosion, composting, building top soil.
- (3) Water, which now runs into the oceans along India's immense river network must be conserved and utilized, especially for irrigation.
- (4) These three groups of projects are beyond the scope of individual effort. They are collective enterprises which can be made effective only through joint efforts. This involves the fourth necessary step in India—a great affirmation by the Indian people: "We see the problem. Now we will take the steps necessary to master it."

Will a third five year plan plus some foreign loans do the trick? Or does this crucial fourth step require a revolutionary rebirth of energy, hope, and enthusiasm among the peoples of India?

**Again, Those Russians!**

Russians turn up in the most unexpected places. On our desk is the *35th Annual Book List for High Schools, 1961-62*, issued by J. Weston Walsh, Publisher, Portland, Maine. On page 8, under "Mathematics" we read, under the item "Russian College Entrance Examination, Editor, Rachel Hutchinson," the following:

Have you ever wondered just how far ahead of us the Russian student is by the time he is ready to enter college? If so, send for this collection of 35 questions from the algebra and geometry entrance exams to Moscow State University. Complete with solutions. Be able to show your students that hard work is necessary to keep up with the Russians in mathematics.

Even in mathematics examinations the Russians set a standard that is hard to match.

**Times Are Changing**

Over most of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, farming is the chief occupation of peoples. In an industrialized nation like Great Britain farming is an unimportant detail as compared with commerce, industry, transport.

Time was in the United States when farmers topped the list of the gainfully occupied. Government economists, remembering this page in United States history, still divide occupations into "agricultural" and "non-agricultural." But times have changed. United States census takers in 1960 found 4.6 million employed in agriculture and 60 million in "non-agricultural" pursuits, which means that farming presently engages about one in fourteen of the occupied population. (As lately as 1950 it was one in eight.)

When it comes to income, the discrepancy is even greater. The *Federal Reserve Bulletin* for July 1961 reported personal income for those engaged in agriculture as \$16.7 billion, or one twenty-fifth of the personal income total for the United States.

Time was when agriculture employed more people than all other United States occupations combined. Today, it is a tiny tail on the big body of United States economy.

**Economic Expansion**

*The Wall Street Journal*, August 10, 1961, headlined an

article on page one:

**U.S. Processors Add Plants Overseas. Aim to Tap Growing Market. Heinz Tests Baked Beans in Singapore. Kellogg Will Produce Cereal in Brazil.**

Almost every major American producer of food products has joined the parade to foreign lands. Some are going abroad for the first time. Others are adding to existing empires, pushing into new countries and introducing more products to their lines.

In the past four months General Foods Corporation has acquired one Australian and three European firms at a cost of between \$7 and \$10 millions. Campbell Soup Company poured \$5.6 million into expansion abroad in the fiscal year ending July 31. Corn Products Company will invest \$15 million in overseas ventures this year and at the moment is building new facilities in Brazil, Chile, Venezuela and Japan; it just finished a tapioca plant in the Philippines. Another old hand at foreign trade, H. J. Heinz Company, got about two-thirds of its earnings in the fiscal year ended March 31 for foreign operations.

United States big business, with huge, unwieldy profit surpluses which it can no longer invest at home, spills over the frontiers, looking for fast bucks abroad. Commerce Department men do the scouting. State Department personnel shepherd the procession. Central Intelligence Agency attends to the dirty-work. The Department of Defense-Aggression convoys the big business operators and threatens those who would interfere with the "natural right" of economic expansion.

#### Nothing If Not Aggressive

Washington's pose since war's end in 1945 has been that of a rich, well-armed, peace-loving great power. President Eisenhower's face was habitually wreathed in peaceful placating smiles. President Kennedy, in his own stern, business-like posture, is as strong for peace as he is for freedom.

There is a Chinese proverb: "I listen with respect to what you say, but I observe what you do."

Tad Szulc wrote in the *New York Times* of August 21, 1961:

The South Vietnamese Army, equipped and trained by the United States in new jungle warfare tactics, was reported today to have assumed initiative in the seven-year struggle with Communist guerrillas. Administration officials said that since May, when the reorganization of the Army began, the pro-Western Vietnamese

forces "had started 75 percent of the fights," and had won four important victories.

Across the Pacific, in Far Asia, in August 1961, the United States was waging war by proxy, as it waged war by proxy in Cuba four months earlier.

Chinese spokesmen insist that as long as the institutions of empire exist, wars will be waged as an indispensable means of empire building and empire defense. This principle is upheld by current experience, even in the case of the peace-loving American Empire.

#### More Grab-And-Keep Tragedy

We titled one of our books *The Tragedy of Empire* because the word "tragedy" implies defeat, and the empires of the last six thousand years (except for the contemporary prototypes) have, without exception, been defeated, dismembered, destroyed.

Empires built during modern times are suffering a similar fate. The planet-circling British Empire is crumbling. Spain, Germany, Japan, Italy, Holland, Belgium, and Portugal are losing colonies and dependencies. Today, history has France on the carpet. From Waterloo until the War of 1914 the French Empire was second only to the British. Like its fellow victims of the empire-building mania, France is caught in the anti-empire cross currents,—bled white in Indo-China, foiled and frustrated in North Africa.

Conquest, military occupation, and economic exploitation are, at best, anti-social forces. At its best and worst, imperialism drives its devotees along the rocky road toward defeat and dismemberment.

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## NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

*(continued from back cover)*

We recently talked with a friend of ours who teaches at [a nearby college]. He has been active in SANE and in the Peace Committee of the Friends Service Committee. We were much moved by what he said, and we have asked him to come talk with us again and with some of our neighbors next Sunday evening at eight o'clock.

We'd be very pleased if you are interested and would like to join us. Could you please give me a ring to let me know whether you would or not?

The response exceeded even her most sanguine guess. Nearly all those invited came, and they formed a study and discussion group which has continued to function. Our friend thinks that others will have as much success as she did if they will but try. If any of you do, please let us know what happens.

An extraordinarily clear and effective analysis of the Berlin situation is contained in the Convocation Lecture delivered at the Claremont (California) Summer Session by Fred Warner Neal, Professor of International Relations and Government at Claremont. We wanted to publish this in MR last month but Professor Neal had already given permission for it to be published elsewhere. Now, we are glad to say, it has been made available as a pamphlet entitled "War and Peace and the Problem of Berlin." We hope many MR readers will undertake to distribute copies of this pamphlet far and wide. The address to write to is: F. F. Fodor, 4422 Ridge Street, Chevy Chase, Maryland.

In the Preface to his new book, *Freedom: Promise and Menace*, Scott Nearing says, "Personally I have gained a great deal from this intensive study of freedom. Except for the war years from 1915-1918, I have not learned so much in so short a time." Coming from a man who has been a teacher for over half a century, that should invite your curiosity—see the ad on page 285 for details on ordering.

Our good friend James Aronson, editor and co-founder of the *National Guardian*, has received a Rabinowitz Fund grant to write a book on the U.S. press, its structure and practices, and how it helped freeze the American mind into acceptance of the cold war philosophy through distortion and self-censorship. He promises to return any pertinent material you send him that will help round out the picture. Write directly to him at 197 E. 4th Street, New York 9, N. Y.

Discerning readers will have noted the change in our address from 66 Barrow St. to 333 Sixth Avenue, New York 14. This is now our editorial and business office. We were getting too busy to remain any longer on the *Nation* switchboard, so now we have a new phone number also: CHelsea 2-6494.

Recommended pamphlet: *Disarm to Parley* by W. H. Ferry. Order from American Friends Service Committee, 160 N. 15th St., Philadelphia 2, Pa., at 20c per copy.

(continued from inside front cover)

think this is a real bargain, and we believe that those who have already acquired their copies will agree with us. The offer holds until December 31st, after which the price reverts to \$8.50.

In order to get new subscribers as well as sell books, we offer another Christmas special—the *Yalta* book plus a one-year *new* subscription (no renewals) for the list price of the book alone, \$8.50. You can send the book as a Xmas present to one friend and the sub to another. Gift slips will be enclosed according to your directions. Offer ends December 31.

One final Christmas special completes the list: We have left a few hundred copies of the first edition (cloth-bound) of *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution* by the editors. This does not contain the "Cuba Revisited" chapter which was added to the second edition, but in other respects it is the same as the second-edition cloth book now selling for \$3.50. We offer this plus a *new* sub (no renewals) for only \$5. To put it another way, if you get us a new subscriber we will give you a free copy of the cloth bound first edition of the Cuba book. This offer, too, expires on December 31.

A period of anxiety about the results of the latest MR Associates appeal letter is almost over. Some of our friends had us worried because the appeal didn't emit the usual cry of "Help, save us!" but instead urged "Help us grow even bigger." Well, all indications are that they were wrong and the Associates' hunch that the truth would make the most persuasive appeal was correct. The returns are running well ahead of last year, which set a record up to that time. What is particularly gratifying, moreover, is that many relatively new subscribers are joining the old faithfuls in supporting the Associates. May we ask a question, which is also addressed to newsstand buyers who don't receive the Associates appeal letter: Have you joined yet? For details, see the back cover of this issue. Joining the Associates, by the way, is one (admittedly partial) answer to those who ask: "What can I do?"

You can do other things, too, of course, if you are worried, as you should be, about the state of the world and dismayed by the number of people who seem willing to accept its threatened destruction without even so much as a protest. We were particularly impressed by the experience of a New England reader who decided that the time had come to do something more than worry. She sat down and wrote a letter to some 40 people who lived in her neighborhood, most of them not known to her personally. Here, with names omitted, is the text of the letter:

My husband and I have been very much concerned by the lack of resistance in this country to the real threat of nuclear war (compared, for example, with the effective demonstrations that have been organized in Britain).

Erich Fromm said at a recent SANE meeting that most of us spend all of our time thinking about the immediate problems and needs of our families—in our case, for example, should our daughter go to this or that school—and no time in the sort of political activities that might give them a better chance of surviving and leading happy lives.

We worry about this question. We wonder what we can do about it—how "alienated" from activity we have become since, say, the Roosevelt days.

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